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 My project in this essay is to orient — or, both more precisely and more 
modestly, to mine the text in order to provide some suggestions as to how one might 
orient — a reading of the Laws.  To that end, I will offer three sets of reflections, guided 
by these questions.  (1) To begin from the negative, what fundamental dimensions and 
motifs does Plato exclude from the dialogue, indicating that they lie beyond the horizon 
of relevant possibilities for thought that delimits the Athenian Stranger’s conversation 
with Kleinias and Megillus?  (2) How, positively, does Plato define this horizon itself?  
That is, with what basic terms, in what basic relations — and conveyed by what allusions, 
in this case to his earlier major works on polity — does he have the Athenian establish 
this horizon?  (3) Finally, what is the basic force he intends the text of the Laws to have, 
and what is the structure he has the Athenian Stranger give his discourse as a whole in 
order that it might have that force?   
 
 Trying to get such a holistic purchase on a text as monstrously massive as the 
Laws is a daunting, not to say hubristic, undertaking.  On the other hand, its very 
massiveness makes the effort all the more, not the less important.  If there is in the 
Platonic corpus a forest that is hidden by the heterogeneity and bulk of its many stands of 
trees, the Laws is it.  Fortunately, there are several passages in the dialogue that seem 
intended to give us bearings, and we will pay close attention to these.  But, of course, 
singling these out risks being just another way of losing sight of the forest.  At the day’s 
end I take solace in the thought that providing something that is at least worth disagreeing 
with will itself have some orienting power for those who share the ambitious project of 
taking the measure of the Laws as a whole. 
 
I.  What lies excluded, beyond the horizon … 
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Asking what has been excluded must seem a peculiar way to begin.  I am motivated 
by an experience that I suspect I share with many readers of the Laws, the mounting 
surprise, as one reads, at the fact that Plato does not invoke almost any of the motifs and 
projects that in earlier dialogues we have been led to think of as defining the depths of 
philosophy.  He leaves un-introduced, seemingly beyond the reach of the Athenian 
Stranger, eros as the drawnness of the soul to the face of the beloved and the Beautiful — 
and, so, to the transcendental horizon of the forms — that we know from the palinode in 
the Phaedrus and Diotima’s ladder in the Symposium, respectively.1  Nor is there any 
mention of the “greatest study,” the pursuit of the Good, that is the deepest project of the 
Republic and sets the goal of the “longer way” that proceeds through the development of 
dialectic in the Sophist and the Statesman and that climaxes, on my reading, in the 
Philebus.2  (Nor, it goes without saying, is there any indication of the arguably still more 
basic notions of the One and of the Great and the Small.3)  We do, however, get a 
reminder of the mathematical studies of Republic VII both at the end of the Stranger’s 
discussion of education in Laws VII and, albeit in very compressed form, in the 
discussion of the “more precise education” (965b) that the members of the Nocturnal 
Council will need — but this is one of those exceptions that proves the rule: the highest 
of the mathematical studies explicitly proposed for the members of the Nocturnal Council 
is astronomy, not harmonics — yet in the Republic it is especially the passage from the 
study of figure in the geometrical studies, including astronomy, to the study of ratio in 
harmonics that bridges the philosopher-to-be into dialectic;4 in the Laws, it seems, 
                                                
1 For the lover’s transformative sight of the beloved’s face, see Phaedrus 254b.  For Diotima’s 
ladder, see Symposium 210a-212a. 
2 For the “study” of the Good, see Republic 505a and ff.; for the motif of the longer way,” see 
435d and 504b-e.  (I have tried to lay out the trajectory of this “way” as it leads from the Republic through 
the later dialogues in Miller 2003 and 2010.) 
3 See Aristotle’s controversial introduction of these notions and his claim that Plato introduced 
them to explain “good and ill” in Metaphysics A6.  For a sense of the variety of recent interpretations that 
take Aristotle’s report seriously, see Krämer 1990; Sayre 2005; and Miller 1995, 2003.  Note also the 
intriguing, if gestural, remarks of Kahn 2001, 58-62. 
4 See Robins 1995, Miller 1999.  
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astronomy, not harmonics and, so, also not dialectic, is the highest study projected for the 
members of the Nocturnal Council.5 
 
But ought we to have been surprised to find all this — above all, the Good and the 
forms and the depths of eros and mathematics that open the soul to them — excluded 
from the world of the Laws?  In fact, in the stage-setting opening pages of the dialogue, 
the text as much as tells us that precisely this is what, in setting its highest aim, it will 
leave out.  There we learn that the elderly threesome are on a walk in the countryside, 
with lovely shade trees to provide places for rest and relief from the Cretan heat; thus, as 
in the Phaedrus, they are not only at leisure — they are also outside the city and free 
from the restraints that propriety puts on exploring the critical and unseemly and perhaps 
subversive; what’s more, the path ascends to a height, the recurrent Platonic symbol of 
the Socratic/Eleatic quest for the forms, the orienting bounds of the perceptual and 
political given; and at this height we will come to the sacred source of the laws and the 
state.  But here, of course, is the manifold rub: the height we aim for is a cave, the site not 
of the light or ether of an upper realm but, rather, of the very lack of such light and 
clarity, and the source of the laws is the birth-place of, therefore, what is precisely not 
timeless, hence not the site of the forms and the Good but rather of what is in time and 
subject to cultural representation, namely, Zeus, the chief of the anthropomorphic 
Olympian gods.  Thus the opening page gives fair warning, at least on reflection, that in 
the Laws we will be operating within the bounds of the sense of reality not of the 
philosopher but rather, at best, of the acceptant πίστις, the metaphysical “trust,” of the 
thoughtful citizen.  
 
II. … and what marks horizon: “the god” and the “first” and “second-best” cities 
 
                                                
5 I say “it seems” advisedly. There is an intriguing exchange at the very close of the dialogue in 
which the Athenian, punning on ἀπόρρητα and ἀπρόρρητα, “indescribable” and “imprescribable” in 
Bury’s deft retrieval in Bury 1926, points to the further studies that the Nocturnal Council members will 
need to undertake but declares it pointless to specify what they are until the Council members have studied 
deeply enough to understand the specification and take them up.  Thus he places these unidentified studies 
beyond the horizon of his conversation with the quite non-mathematical Kleinias and Megillus. 
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“Is it [a] god or some human being (Θεὸς ἤ τις ἀνθρώπων), strangers, that you 
take to be the cause of the establishing of your laws?”6 With these, the opening words of 
the dialogue, the Athenian Stranger indicates the double boundary of this pre-
philosophical sense of reality.   
 
On the one hand, there is “god” or “the god.”  This figure is left both 
indeterminate and fundamental: only loosely associated with both Zeus and Cronus (see 
(2) below), he is the presiding power in the world.  In the opening words of his prelude to 
the assembled Magnesians the Athenian puts him first as the god who “holds the 
beginning and the end and the middles (μέσα) of all that is” (IV:715ef.); he “is always 
attended by Justice” (ibid); and he is the “measure of all things” and the being who, in 
order that we “become dear to him, [we must] do all in [our] power to become like” 
(IV:716c-d).  These elevating references leave him shadowy, however.  Only in the 
digression on atheism and the gods in Book X will he receive a sharper — and suddenly 
quite unconventional — portrayal as the good soul possessed of intelligence that, self-
moving, sets all else, above all the sun, into motion. 
 
On the other hand, there is the city that is ruled by law.  Here we face a thicket of 
well-known — if not allusions, then at least — pointed resonances of the Republic and 
the Statesman, in the course of which the Athenian Stranger establishes the status of 
Magnesia as a “second-best” city.  There are four passages to note. 
 
(1) εἰς ταὐτὸν … συμπέσῃ (“… coincide in the same …,” 711e8f.)  In a 
reflection on the interplay of god, chance, and art in Book IV, the Stranger argues that the 
conditions that would make for “the swiftest and easiest” (712a, cf. 710b, 711c) 
transformation of an existing city into “the best and with the best laws” would be the 
partnership of “a lawgiver who knows the truth” (709c) and a young tyrant of moderate 
character; still better is when these are one and the same man, “when the greatest power 
                                                
6 The translations in this essay are my own.  But I have consulted the translations of Bury 1926, 
Saunders 1975, and Pangle 1980, and I have learned a great deal, as always, from conversation with my 
Vassar colleague in Classics, Rachel Kitzinger.  
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coincides in the same [man] (εἰς ταὐτὸν … συμπέσῃ), one with intelligence and 
moderation” (711e8-a2).  Can one who knows the Republic help but hear the resonance 
of Socrates’ paradoxical declaration that the “smallest change” (473b) that would allow 
his just city to be realized would be for “political power and philosophy [to come to] 
coincide in the same [man] (εἰς ταὐτὸν … συμπέσῃ)” (473d), the philosopher-king?  
But by the very association that Plato provokes in the Laws by his repetition of the 
language of the Republic he gives us occasion to notice that the Athenian hopes for 
something pointedly different from what Socrates did: the “truth” that the Athenian’s 
“lawgiver” “knows” is not what Socrates’ figure of the philosopher seeks, the Good and 
the forms, but rather “the best laws,” and so the tyrant the Athenian fantasizes, rather than 
becoming a philosopher, will make himself the agent who establishes those laws in his 
city; and since, as the Stranger argues, it is by the example the tyrant sets for his subjects 
that he can best bring about the transformation of his city, to establish the best laws 
requires that he begin by subjecting himself to them.  Accordingly, while Socrates’ 
philosopher-king rules from above the law, the moderate tyrant brings it about that all, 
himself included, are subject to the rule of law.7 
 
(2) ἐπὶ Κρόνου (“… in the time of Cronus,” 713b2).  Only a few speeches later, 
at 713a-714a, the Athenian sets the stage for his prelude to the Magnesians by 
introducing the “myth” of the age of Cronus.  Readers of the Statesman will recognize 
this as Plato’s return — but, again, with several interesting differences — to the great 
myth that he has the Eleatic Stranger present in that dialogue.8  Long ago, the Athenian 
now says, we humans lived under Cronus in a paradisiacal condition, free both from 
material scarcity and internal strife.  How did Cronus manage this?  He knew that, 
“human nature” being what it is, no man can be an “autocrat” over the rest without falling 
into “hubris and injustice,” and so just as we now put ourselves in charge of cattle, he put 
δαίμονες, “divinities” — that is, beings of a higher species — in charge of us; these 
divinities, in effect our shepherds, provided us “peace and good laws (εὐνομίαν) and 
                                                
7 For discussion of these convergences and divergences, see especially Schofield 1999. 
8 See Statesman 268d-274e, noting its references to the rule of Cronus at 269a, 271c, and 272b. 
For discussion, see Miller 2004, ch. III.A. 
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unstinting justice” (713e).  “Good laws” and “justice” are absent in the Statesman myth, 
where human beings are earth-born and their lives are thoroughly pre-political.  The 
Athenian Stranger, accordingly, is now reading the presence of “good laws” and the 
political justice they establish back into the time of Cronus.  The general point of this 
adaptation, the Athenian makes plain enough.  We humans can hardly gainsay the god’s 
knowledge of our nature.  Accordingly, no one should risk trying to rule autocratically 
over the rest; instead we must all “imitate” the life we had under Cronus and his divinities 
by subordinating ourselves to that “within us that partakes of immortality,” namely to 
“the dispensation by νοῦς (mind) that we call νόμος (law)” (714a). 
 
But if the general point is clear, in its specifics it sets the stage for the rest of the 
dialogue by raising big questions.  Among them: what is it that the god knows about 
“human nature” that dooms to injustice any man’s effort to rule autocratically?  What is 
the sense of “imitation” according to which, in resisting any such autocracy and holding 
to the rule of “good laws,” we are “imitating” the rule of Cronus and his divinities?  In 
what sense is “[what] we call νόμος” a “dispensation by νοῦς”?  And how may we get 
our bearings in order to attempt to achieve — and, now as we read the Laws, in order to 
determine how well the Athenian actually does achieve — this “dispensation”? 
 
(3) … ὅτι μάλιστα κοινὰ τὰ φίλων (“… as much as possible, … things in 
common,” 739c1-2).  We get some help with these questions from the third resonant 
passage, at 739cff.  Here Plato has the Athenian’s words echo Socrates’ formulation of 
the principle of the best possible polity at Republic 423e-424a: where Socrates declares 
that the rulers of his just and good city “will easily discover … how all … must be 
governed as far as possible (ὅτι μάλιστα) by the old proverb (κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν) that 
friends share things in common (κοινὰ τὰ φίλων),” the Athenian declares that “the first” 
and “best” city will be that in which “the ancient adage (τὸ πάλαι λεγόμενον) is realized 
throughout the city as far as possible (ὅτι μάλιστα), namely, that “friends share things in 
common” (κοινὰ τὰ φίλων)” (739c).  And in his detailing of this sharing, the Athenian 
reiterates Socrates’ vision in each of its key aspects: women and children and “every sort 
of property” will be “common” — that is, there will be no private family or private 
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property —, and this will enable the extraordinary spiritual unity that Socrates 
celebrates9 in the Republic, the  “community” of pleasure and pain: “everyone,” says the 
Athenian, will “praise and blame in unison, as much as possible delighting in the same 
things and feeling pain at the same things” (739d).10  As before, however, so here, and 
much more explicitly, Plato reminds us of Socrates’ city in the Republic in order to mark 
how the Athenian’s project differs from it.  A city in which all things are “in common” 
would have to have, for its inhabitants, “gods or the children of gods” (739d); Magnesia, 
by contrast, is to be inhabited by human beings and so can only be the “second best” city.    
 
This notion of “second-best” (739a, e) marks the aspiration as well as the 
limitedness of the city that the Athenian now begins to design, and this double aspect, 
this sense in which Magnesia is, while only second, nonetheless second-best, is the key to 
his notion that human polity must “imitate” the rule of Cronus and his divinities; now, 
however, it is the city of “all things in common” that he declares to be the “model” 
(παράδειγμα, 739e1) that we must “hold to” and “seek to realize as fully as possible.”  
Accordingly, even while the Athenian accommodates the humanity of its citizens, their 
non-divine “birth, nurture, and education” (740a), by accepting private property and 
separate family units, he also subordinates the private to the common.  The land, he 
declares at 739e, must be divided into separate lots and farmed not in common but by 
different households; but it is family lines, not individuals, to whom the land is assigned, 
and this assignment is inalienable and inalterable “for the rest of time” (740b); “each man 
                                                
9 I leave for another occasion the complex and controversial question of what irony there may or 
may not be in Socrates’ projection of this “community” and, indeed, in his denials of private property and 
family to the guardians. 
10 Laks 2001, re-affirmed by Bobonich 2002 (482 n. 7), while stressing these resonances of the 
Republic in the Laws, argues that the “first” and “best city” posited in the Laws is not Socrates’ just city, 
for in the latter private property and the private family are abolished only among the guardians, not 
throughout the whole city.  I don’t see this as a distinguishing point, for in both Socrates’ and the 
Athenian’s formulations, the principle of κοινὰ τὰ φίλων is to be realized only ὅτι μάλιστα, “as far as 
possible.”  Thus Plato has the Athenian make the very same general concession, and in the same words, 
that Socrates did; accordingly, there is no reason to presume that the Athenian thinks that in the “first” and 
“best city” “friendship” will extend to all the citizens nor, therefore, that the sharing of everything can be 
realized among all the citizenry.  The restriction of the sharing to the guardians in the Republic, then, 
should not be taken as a point of distinction of Socrates’ just city from the Athenian’s first and best city.  
Laks acknowledges the possibility of this reading but argues for a distinction between the grounds for the 
restriction of the principle of sharing in the just city of the Republic and in the “first” city in the Laws — 
see esp. p. 109. 
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who receives an allotment should deem it to be at the same time the common possession 
of the whole city” (740b), given in irreversible trust.  Thus, in this and many other ways, 
the Athenian sets out to construct a mean, a political order that, even as it falls short, 
expresses the fullest possible human approximation of the divine. 
 
(4) δίο δὴ τὸ δεύτερον αἱρετέον, τάχιν τε καὶ νόμον (“for this reason one 
must choose the second-best, ordinance11 and law,” 875d3).  At 874e-875d, Plato has the 
Athenian interject a reflection on the status of the rule of law that cannot help but remind 
one who has read the Statesman of the Eleatic Stranger’s subtle and dialectically 
balanced position on that question — but, again, with telling differences.  The Athenian, 
about to turn to the class of personal injuries in all their inexhaustible empirical variety, 
acknowledges that law cannot, as true understanding can, address the specificity of each 
situation; it can only speak ἐπὶ τὸ πόλυ, addressing particular situations “for the most 
part” or “on average” (875d4).  And just before saying this he declares that “no law or 
ordinance surpasses12 knowledge, nor is it right that mind (νοῦν) be subservient or slave 
to anything else — on the contrary, it should rule over all things, provided it is genuine 
and really free to be itself.”  On both counts he reiterates criticisms of the limitations of 
law that Plato has the Eleatic Stranger make in the Statesman — but with striking 
differences in each case.  Whereas the Eleatic embeds his criticism of law’s directedness 
to the average within the context of endorsing its usefulness to the true or knowing 
statesman, the Athenian undermines this whole by his bottom-line declaration that “such 
understanding, genuine and really free to be itself, … in the present day does not exist 
anywhere at all, except in fragment.”  Thus he declares as a basic truth what the Eleatic 
instead credits to the ruled, the subjects of contemporary democracy and oligarchy alike, 
namely, the deep and pervasive suspicion that their rulers do not possess true knowledge 
of the ruling art and instead pursue their own interests.  Accordingly, where the Eleatic, 
though hardly confident, nonetheless himself remains open to the possibility that a 
                                                
11 This is Bury’s translation of τάχιν.  The more general “order” would be misleading, for 
“order” belongs to the rule of knowledge as well as to that of law.  
12 Plato has the Athenian say, “no law or any order is κρείττων than knowledge.”  Κρείττων, the 
comparative form of ἀγαθός, means both “stronger” and “better.”  My translation follows Saunders 1975 
in trying to avoid choosing between these.  
  
 9 
knowing statesman may appear, the Athenian is closed to it and concludes, without 
qualification, that “for this reason one must choose the second-best, ordinance and law.” 
 
In noting these differences, I do not mean to beg the question of Plato’s position, 
nor do I mean, in characterizing the Athenian as closed, to suggest that he is dogmatic or 
unreasoning.  On the contrary, in reaching his position he goes deeper than the suspicion 
of the ruled, and he provides the elements of a subtle psychological analysis.  To the 
ruled, as the Eleatic reconstructs their position in the Statesman, their ruler or rulers lack 
knowledge and instead pursue their own interests; to the Athenian, by contrast, even if 
one should somehow manage the immensely difficult task of achieving knowledge, 
nonetheless, he should not be trusted to rule accordingly.  For although he would know 
that “the common binds cities together whereas the private tears them apart” (875a6-7), 
“his mortal nature (ἡ θνητὴ φύσις) will always drive him towards getting more for 
himself and [advancing] his private interests (ἐπὶ πλεονεξίαν καὶ ἰδιοπραγίαν), causing 
him to flee pain irrationally and to pursue pleasure and to put both of these before what is 
more just and better” (875b6-8).  
 
Earlier, reflecting on the Athenian’s tale of Cronus’ imposition of the rule of 
divinities, we asked what it is that the god knows about “human nature” that dooms to 
injustice any man’s effort to rule autocratically.  In accepting private property and 
separate families, the Athenian appropriates the same divine knowledge — or, we could 
say equally well, in first crediting it to the god he declares as a noetic insight — that the 
community of pleasure and pain lies beyond our capacity as human beings.  But while we 
cannot transcend the claim the private makes upon us in the form of the inescapable 
power of our own pleasures and pains, we can acknowledge this claim and attempt to put 
it in check.  This brings us back to the double aspect of the idea of the “second-best.”  For 
the Athenian Stranger, adopting the rule of law is itself the expression of this 
acknowledgment and, so — at least if we can follow through and craft good laws — “a 
dispensation of νοῦς.”  Appreciating this should give us our bearings as, moving from 
tree to tree to tree in the forest of the Laws, we attend to the Athenian’s law-giving.  In 
each case we need to try to ask: has he struck the mean between the divine and the 
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human, achieving the fullest possible internalization, in the order and life of our 
inescapably human community, of the rule of the god and the ethical priority of the 
common? 
 
III. Towards an understanding of the force and structure of the text as a whole 
 
Our third task, trying to grasp the force and structure13 of the text of the Laws as 
a whole, is forbiddingly difficult; doing it full justice in the space remaining is of course 
impossible.  Nonetheless, there are at least two passages in which, however indirectly, the 
text itself seems to give us direction, and we can use these to make a beginning.  Let me 
comment as succinctly as I can on each, then let them guide us in a first effort to make 
out the force and compositional structure of the Athenian’s exegesis of the Magnesian 
constitution. 
 
A. 811c-d: the poetic force of the discourse as a whole 
 
The first to consider is the exchange at 811c-d in which the Athenian reports with 
a sense of delight that his speeches, considered in retrospect, suddenly look like divinely 
inspired poetry.  Kleinias has just asked the Stranger what “model” (παράδειγμα) he 
might offer for the sort of “literature” (τὰ γράμματα) he would recommend for the 
young.  Here is a translation of the passage:14 
 
AS: It may well be that I’ve had a stroke of good luck. 
 
K: In what regard? 
 
AS: When I now look back at the reflections (λόγους) we’ve been working 
through from dawn to this very moment, and not, it appears to me, without some 
                                                
13 For different approaches to the structure of the Laws, see Laks 2000, esp. section 2, and 
Voegelin 1957.   
14 This passage provides a rich exhibition of the adage that translation is interpretation.  Compare 
Saunders’ alternative renderings of παντάπασι ποιήσει τινὶ προσομοίως as “just like a literary 
composition” and of οἷον ἀθρόους as “my ‘collected works,’ so to speak.”  Saunders’ evocations of the 
literary and the editorial rather than the poetic at least open the way for the reading of the passage as 
Platonic irony on the Athenian’s authorial pride that David Roochnik advances with such wit at the close of 
his essay in this volume. 
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inspiration from gods, they seem to me in every way to have been spoken like a 
work of poetry (παντάπασι ποιήσει τινὶ προσομοίως εἰρῆσθαι).  No wonder, 
then, that a feeling of delight comes over me as I gaze at our own speeches 
(λόγους οἰκείους) gathered, as it were, in close array (οἷον ἁθρόους); of all the 
many discourses I’ve listened to or studied, whether spoken in verse or in a free 
flow (χύδην) like ours, they appear to me the best measured, really (μετριώτατοί 
γε), and the most fitting of all for the young to hear. 
 
What can the Athenian mean by his characterization of his λόγοι as “spoken like 
a work of poetry”?  He is of course not referring to their diction, for he immediately 
contrasts them with λόγοι “spoken in verse.”  If we focus just on content, we will be 
struck by the Athenian’s claim a bit later that “the [Magnesian] constitution is 
constructed as an imitation (μίμησις) of the noblest and best life, and this, we declare, is 
really the truest tragedy” (817b).  But this, even while we will later see that the notion of 
the best life may indeed be relevant, is the wrong place to focus.  In the passage itself the 
Athenian draws attention instead to the way, first, the discourses “are spoken” as, second, 
this presents itself in retrospect to him as, now, a reflective auditor; what’s more, he 
stresses that they now seem to have been “inspired by gods.”  Shouldn’t this encourage us 
to think that Plato intends the written text to present itself with the force of good poetry, 
that is, as having the power to waken and inspire in its reader a certain vision that alters 
and reorients his sense of the way things are?  But, to be stressed here, this force emerges 
not in the particulars — the syntax, for instance, or turns of phrase15 — of the Stranger’s 
speeches but rather in the way, seen in retrospect, they fit together as a whole; it is only 
when the Stranger steps back and lets the full set of the day’s discourses come to view 
together, “gathered, as it were, in close array,” that he is moved to appreciate their 
poetic force.16 
                                                
15 Though taking this up here would lead us away from the focus the Athenian’s description of his 
retrospective experience suggests, the syntax and phrasing of the Laws are interesting topics. See Nails and 
Thesleff 2003 and, on the heavily periodic style of many of the “later” dialogues, including the Laws, that 
Thesleff calls ongkos, Thesleff 1967. 
16 In the remaining reflections in this essay, I hope to contribute an idea that complements the 
arresting analysis of Nightingale 1993. She brings to focus the analogously unSocratic posture that the 
Athenian takes in addressing Kleinias and Megillus, that the legislator (as the Athenian portrays him) takes 
in addressing the Magnesians, and that Plato takes as he relates to the readers of the Laws: at each level the 
effort is not to liberate the one addressed for independent inquiry but rather to win his acceptance of the 
quasi-scriptural authority of the proposed laws.  Though she recognizes the extensive stretches of argument 
in the Laws, she argues that they are meant to persuade, not to elicit the sort of destabilizing questioning so 
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B. 768d6-8: the interplay of structure and the process of understanding 
 
If we are to share this appreciation, we too must try to step back and let the parts 
come together.  But how?  To see a text whole requires a recognition of the distinction 
and fit of its parts, and at least initially, the monstrous reach of the conversation resists 
such structural judgments, making them seem capricious.  This difficulty makes the 
second of our two passages crucial: at 768d6-8, midway through Book VI, Plato appears 
to give us guiding language for the way the conversation, at least from the moment that 
the Athenian takes up the project of founding Magnesia, should be seen in its 
compositional totality.  As we shall see, this language has a dynamism about it that 
makes it puzzling at first; but this dynamism, I will suggest, proves to reflect the phases 
of the process by which the text brings the reader to just that sort of visionary experience 
and retrospective understanding of the whole that the Athenian speaks of at 811c-d. 
 
We should begin by locating 768d6-8 in its surrounding context: the Athenian has 
twice stressed that a constitution has two fundamental “aspects” (εἴδη), related as part 
and counterpart: the “offices” (ἀρχαί) of the state and the “laws” (νόμοι) by which the 
officers regulate the various practices that fall within their spheres.  (See 735a and 751a.)  
The primary task of Book VI is to identify the “offices,” and at 768c he is nearing 
completion of this task; he has just given a sketch of the system of courts and is about to 
turn to “a sorting out of [the] δίκαι (suits and prosecutions)” that each will hear when he 
stops himself.  Since δίκαι proceed on the basis of the “laws,” it would be better, he 
suggests, to suspend discussion of them until “the end of the law-giving.”  He then gives 
us what I take to be the key sentence for identifying the dynamic structure of the Laws as 
a whole.17 
                                                                                                                                            
often at the core of the dialogues.  I suggest that this discursive work is consummated in, and the receptive 
reader’s grasp of it is oriented by, the visionary experience that, I will try to show, the Laws is structured to 
occasion. 
17 I speak of “the structure of the Laws as a whole,” and not just of the discussion of the founding 
of Magnesia, because by having the Stranger focus on the latter in the key sentence that we will now 
consider, Plato marks off and includes what precedes the founding as a kind of stage-setting for it.  
Although I intend my remarks in Parts I and II of this essay as selective contributions to an understanding 
  
 13 
 
In regard to each and all of the specifics of the entire constitutional 
ordering of the city, it isn’t possible for the whole in its precise structure to 
become clear until our exegesis has proceeded from [the] beginning and, 
taking up the things second in order and the middle things and all [of its] 
parts, reaches [the] end.”18 
 
On first hearing, the Athenian’s designation of the parts through which one moves 
from the “beginning” to the “end” is puzzling.  His phrase τὰ δεύτερα, “the things 
second in order,” suggests a linear movement “from the beginning” through enumerated 
stages — but if that were the whole story, we would expect to come next to the ‘third 
things,’ not to τὰ μέσα, “the middle things.”  And again, τὰ μέσα suggests a three-fold 
composition, with the initial movement “from the beginning” to “the middle things” 
balanced by a final movement from “the middle things” to a final set of parts that 
compose “the end” — so it is a surprise to come, instead, to “all [the] parts,” not, that is, 
to a final third but, rather, to the whole ensemble of all the parts together.    
 
What these moments of surprise give us occasion to recognize is that the 
Athenian, rather than simply distinguishing parts, speaks with reference to the process of 
moving through them.  To mark the most obvious sense in which this is so: ἀρχή, 
“beginning,” connotes a source or what is primary, and a τέλος, “end,” is not just a 
terminal point but, rather, a goal or target that gives us a sense of direction along the way; 
to depart from an ἀρχή is to begin with an orienting sense of what is most important, and 
to move toward a τέλος is to approach completion or fulfillment.  More deeply, the 
Athenian appears to be distinguishing the phases of this process by marking the changing 
sense or aspect under which the discourse itself and its contents will present themselves 
to us as we move through it.  His language suggests we should expect two moments of 
transformation.  In the first, as we move on from “the things second in order,” “the 
                                                                                                                                            
of the context that Books I-III set for the discussion in IV-XII, I must leave for another occasion the task of 
a more comprehensive reading of the internal structure and content of I-III; following the lead of 768d6-8, I 
will concentrate instead on IV-XII.  
18 Τὸ δὲ ὅλον καὶ ἀκριβὲς περὶ ἑνός τε καὶ πάντων τῶν κατὰ πόλιν καὶ πολιτικὴν πᾶσαν 
διοίκησιν οὐκ ἔστι γενέσθαι σαφές, πρὶν ἂν ἡ διέξοδος ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς τά τε δεύτερα καὶ τὰ μέσα καὶ 
πάντα μέρη τὰ ἑαυτῆς ἀπολαβοῦσα πρὸς τέλος ἀφίκηται.  (768d6-8)  I follow Bury 1926 in preferring 
δοίκησιν, proposed by Ast and Schanz, over διοικήσεων.   
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beginning” and “the things second in order” together will be integrated as the first of the 
three, equally weighted and balanced moments of “beginning,” “middle,” and “end.”  In 
the second, as, presumably, we move on from “the middle things” to the “end,” the latter 
will somehow give way to πάντα μέρη, “all [the] parts,” that is, again, the whole 
ensemble that the many “parts” make up together.  Thus the Athenian points ahead to a 
moment when — to repeat for the moment his initially opaque phrase — τὸ ὅλον καὶ 
ἀκριβὲς, “the whole” and “[the] precise structure” of what it integrates, will first present 
themselves and “become clear.” 
 
C. The structure of the “exegesis” and the vision of the whole that is its aim 
 
Responding to the guidance of these two passages, 811c-d and 768d, we have two 
interrelated goals.  First, can we discern in the Athenian’s “exegesis” of the Magnesian 
constitution each of the three phases that we have just distinguished?  Second — and this 
will be to complete this first project —, can we identify the visionary experience of “the 
whole in its precise structure” that the Athenian aims the exegesis, “spoken like a work of 
poetry,” to occasion?   
 
 Let me begin by distinguishing the first two of the three phases.  (1) The nested 
hierarchy of movements from ἡ ἀρχή to τὰ δεύτερα, from the basic to the secondary.  
We have already begun to see the sense in which a movement from ἡ ἀρχή to τὰ 
δεύτερα structures the first phase of the Athenian’s founding.  As throughout the text, 
there are a number of digressions and, so, stops and “second starts” (723e) along the way, 
including, most notably, the reflection on preludes at 718a-723d; but this latter digression 
both provides the occasion for understanding the Athenian’s opening address to the 
assembly of Magnesians as itself a “prelude” to his law-giving (723d, 724a) and sets in 
relief the hierarchical structure by which, before and after the digression, he orders its 
content.  He first works through a remarkable series of those others to whom virtue 
requires we attend, beginning with “the god” and “justice” (715e-716a) and descending 
in order from there through the Olympians, chthonic powers, δαίμονες, heroes, and 
ancestors to our parents (see 717b); then, resuming his prelude at the beginning of Book 
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V, he expands his focus to mark as “second” the soul (727a), as “third” the body (728d), 
and (presumably) as fourth, “money and property” (728e), and then, turning outward 
from children (as, presumably, one’s ownmost property), he moves from friends to fellow 
citizens to strangers, especially suppliants.  Next, drawing on the superiority of the gods 
that he has just established, he moves from the “divine things” (732e), that is, those 
qualities of living — enumerated, once again, in a hierarchical series — that make for a 
virtuous life, to the “human things,” pleasure and pain and desire (732e), that should be 
subordinated to the divine, and he enumerates four pairs of lives, virtuous and vicious, 
that are and are not structured by that subordination.  Finally, again characterizing this 
whole reflection as a “prelude” (734e), he turns to the material organization of Magnesia, 
offering a set of reflections on purges of the citizenry, division and allocation of the land, 
allowable ranges of private wealth, and so on.  The whole complex of relations he has 
thus traced fits together, I suggest, as a kind of nested hierarchy, with the series of relata 
that begins from the god providing orientation for the turn from divine to human things, 
with this turn then providing orientation for the account of virtuous and vicious lives, 
and, finally, with this whole prelude on the subordinative order of moral and ethical life 
providing orientation for his turn to the material organization of the city. 
 
 (2) Reaching τὰ μέσα, “the middle things”: the constitutional order of “offices” 
and “laws.”  The Athenian’s reflections on the material organization of the city, in turn, 
prepare the way for his exegesis of the two fundamental “aspects” of the constitutional 
order of the city, the “offices” (ἀρχαί) of the state and the “laws” (νόμοι) by which each 
group of officers is to govern in their designated domain.  Under the heading of “offices,” 
the Athenian includes the caretakers of the legal order, at the level of the city as a whole 
the Guardians of the Laws and at the level of the tribes and classes the Council; the 
ranked hierarchy of military commanders; those charged with directing religious rites and 
festivals, the various custodians, priests, and mantics; those charged to monitor the 
several place-specific spheres of communal life, the Field and Market and City 
Regulators; and the Supervisor of Education.  This first part of the exegesis takes up the 
opening section of Book VI, 751a-768d, breaking off with the Athenian’s decision at 
768d to defer a full account of the δίκαι, the suits and prosecutions that will occupy the 
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courts, until “the end of the law-giving.”  (For reasons we shall consider later, the 
Nocturnal Council is not introduced until Books IX and XII.)  The exegesis of the “laws,” 
in turn, runs from that point on up to his promised return to δίκαι at the beginning of 
Book IX; by contrast with his treatment of δίκαι, which focuses on violations of the 
moral-ethical order and lays out negative laws and appropriate punishments, the exegesis 
of the laws in Books VI-VIII is essentially positive in character, laying out the normative 
practices in all the spheres of communal life — of education, religious ritual, military 
training, agriculture, the crafts and commerce, and so on — that the various officers have 
just been charged to oversee.   
 
 For a host of reasons, it seems evident that it is these exegeses of the offices and 
the positive laws in VI and VI-VIII that the Athenian has in mind in speaking of “the 
middle things” at 768d.  As a balanced pair, they are a collective plural — hence τὰ 
μέσα, “the middle things.”   As the positive core of the Magnesian constitution, they are 
central to the Athenian’s project, not “secondary” — indeed, they provide the specifically 
‘political’ content of his exegesis and stand as the proper complement of the ‘moral-
ethical’ content of the first phase.  And, of course, they occupy the middle place in what 
they thereby mark as the three-fold unity of his full discourse, standing between the 
orienting ‘moral-ethical’ “prelude” and the treatment of δίκαι in (what, taking our cue 
from the Athenian’s deferral at 768d, he now appears to project as) the third and final 
part.  In this final part we may expect to learn of the various violations of these normative 
practices and the juridical penalties by which potential violators are warned off and actual 
violators are corrected.  Accordingly, whereas, on the one hand, the middle part’s 
detailing of the normative practices of communal life and its identification of those 
charged with directing and maintaining them fits together with the moral-ethical prelude 
as, roughly, a positive and specific explication with the general principles to be 
explicated, the middle part fits together with the (projected) treatment of δίκαι as, 
roughly, the positive and normative with its negation and restoration.19 
 
                                                
19 Cf. Laks 2000, esp. section 6. 
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 (3) Remaining in step and/or breaking stride? The structural function of Books 
IX, X, and XI-XII.  Or so, certainly, it seems, as, following the Athenian, we move into 
Book IX.  But we have already noted Plato’s warning to us, through the Athenian’s 
initially surprising language at 768d6-8, that the final phase of his exegesis will not just 
provide the last member of its three-fold unity but, beyond that, will in some way bring 
into view πάντα μέρη, “all [the] parts,” and, so, “the whole in its precise structure.”  To 
put ourselves into position to see how this may be so, it is best to begin with a look at 
Books XI-XII, then return to IX-X. 
 
 [i] Books XI-XII: the spheres of communal life, brought to view together.  We 
need to start by acknowledging a peculiar difficulty: interpreting the role of Books XI-
XII in the Laws as a whole is complicated by the apparent fact that, at least up until the 
introduction of the Nocturnal Council at 960c, these pages not been subjected to a final 
drafting or even editing.  The evidence for this is manifold: with the exception of a very 
few one-line utterances,20 the text takes the form of straightforward expository prose, 
with no dialogue with Kleinias and Megillus and with none of the internal dramatization 
of the law-giver’s address to the Magnesians that Plato has the Athenian make such 
frequent use of in I-X; nor is there any connective tissue to make for natural 
conversational transitions from the consideration of one topic to the consideration of the 
next;21 finally, at 953e-956b there is a veritable heap, seemingly random in sequence, of 
short declarative edicts on unrelated matters.22  This is not to say that there is no 
discernible order and grouping in XI-XII — on the contrary.  But if it is true, as the state 
of the text up to 960c does suggest, that Plato never subjected them to a final drafting, 
then we have only that order and grouping, and none of the sort of rhetorical and 
dramatic cues that we do find everywhere else in the text (including, thankfully, in the 
                                                
20In Books XI-XII up to the discussion of the Nocturnal Council at 960c, Kleinias is given stand-
alone one-line utterances at 918c8 and 951c5; a cluster of three one-line utterances at 931b1, b4, and d3; 
and a cluster of five one-line utterances at 922c6, c10, d3, d9, and e5.  Megillus has no lines.  
21 Detailing this would take the space of a full essay.  But note the 28 two-line breaks that Pangle 
1980 inserts throughout Books XI-XII in his translation. 
22 The Athenian suggests codes addressing, in this order, pledging security, searches, statutes of 
limitations on claims, preventing a fellow citizen's appearances at trials and contests, receiving stolen 
goods, harboring exiles, making private war or peace, bribing officials, taxation, and votive offerings. 
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final section at 960c-end), to take our bearings from in seeking an understanding of how 
XI-XII fit into the Laws as a whole.   
 
 What, then, can we make out?  There are two basic features to note.  First, if we 
step back and survey the kinds and the sequence of the laws the Athenian proposes, we 
will see that he moves by family resemblance-style associations through four areas of 
communal life: at 913a-922a he lays out various principles governing movable property 
and commercial “transactions” (συμβολαίων, 913a), ranging from the prohibition of 
taking what belongs to another through restrictions on exchange and retail trade to the 
obligations binding craftsmen;23 at 922a-932d, turning to the last important kind of 
“transaction,” wills (922b), he moves into family law, establishing rules of inheritance 
that preserve through death each family line’s allotment of land and various regulations 
for the associated matters of the treatment of orphans, the disowning of bad children and 
deranged parents, divorce, and the neglect and dishonoring of elderly parents; at 932e-
938c he proposes laws in the area of personal injury, prohibiting and punishing 
poisoning, theft and physical injury, letting mad relatives run loose in the city, verbal 
abuse and ridicule, beggary, and — as interesting transitional cases into the next area — 
giving false testimony and hiring a professional orator as one’s advocate in court; and at 
941a-953e he takes up a host of obligations that citizens have to the state when they 
operate as its agents in official capacities ranging from ambassador, herald, and soldier to 
officer and/or auditor of officers to attendant and performer at religious festivals to, 
finally, traveler abroad or receiver of visitors from abroad.24  Second, this movement not 
only supplements the Athenian’s earlier treatments of production and commerce in Book 
                                                
23 His final topic is, strangely, the “wages” due to military experts as the “craftsmen 
[δημιουργῶν] of our security” (921d4) — namely, “honors.” (921d-922a) 
24 I deliberately forego further comment on 953e-956b and on the pages following this section 
and preceding the resumption of dialogue and introducing the Nocturnal Council at 960c.  The former reads 
as a mere aggregate of items that are undeveloped in content and, so far as I can tell, not put in any 
significant order; I am tempted to think of this as, to resort to anachronism, a folder of items held in reserve 
for future consideration.  The immediately following pages divide into short treatments of judicial 
procedure (including paragraphs on the three levels of courts, appeal processes, and jury selection) and 
funerals (958c-960b).  The latter may be placed here in a playful mirroring of the life of the citizen with the 
trajectory of the dialogue itself; both are nearing their “ends,” their τελευτή (958d2) and their τέλος 
(960b5), respectively.  But I wonder whether these sections shouldn’t be counted as two more items in the 
‘folder’ of 953e-956b, which would then reach to 960b.  Both passages lack dialogue form and any 
connective rhetoric that would link them and indicate a deliberate place in the flow of the text. 
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VIII, of the family in Books VI-VII, of bodily injury in Book IX, and of the duties of 
officers in Book VI — in doing so, it turns our attention back to these, and now, 
accordingly, not as regions of communal life to be grasped for the first time but rather, 
since we know them already, as aspects of this life to be considered in their 
interrelations.25  Thus we pass from the sphere of material goods, craft production, and 
commerce, a sphere from which the citizens proper, denied participation in trade and the 
crafts, are largely banned, to the family, both the biological root of the citizenry and the 
legal bearer, in trust from the city, of the land as property, to the individuals who are 
materially supported and raised and nourished in the first two spheres; and here we move 
from the individual as patient, as the body and soul that must be protected from injury 
and insult, to the individual as agent of the community, exercising the duties of the 
various offices and so, in all the ways laid out in Book VI, taking responsibility for 
communal life itself.   
 
 Is it well-taken, then, to see in the grouping and sequence of topics in XI-XII the 
indication of Plato’s plan to put “all [the] parts,” πάντα μέρη, both of his exegesis and, 
correspondingly, of the city itself, before the reflective reader?  But we should proceed 
slowly here; as consideration of Books IX-X and of the closing pages on the Nocturnal 
Council will bring to the fore, our picture is still incomplete in at least two crucial ways. 
 
 [ii] Books IX-X: the god as measure of the city.  The first word of Book IX is 
Δίκαι.  Thus the Athenian signals that he will now keep his earlier commitment to come 
back to a treatment of “suits and prosecutions” after having completed his exegesis of 
“offices” and the “laws” by which the various officers must govern.  But this is not all.  
He begins IX with a discussion of “temple robberies” or — to give ἱερῶν … συλήσεων 
(853e5-6) its more general sense — “plunder of the sacred,” and he then devotes most of 
the book to the kinds of homicide; but as the Athenian makes clear in invoking the 
                                                
25 There is a further sense in which XI-XII may be seen as a kind of ‘return.’  As Eric Sanday 
shows in his illuminating discussion in this volume, the property-related crimes picked out by the laws in 
Book XI reflect a lapse or breakdown of the subordination of the private to the common, and the suits and 
prosecutions authorized on the basis of these laws aim to restore it.  Analogous rhythms of lapse and 
restoration may be seen, I think, in the Athenian’s treatments of family and of the person in Book XI and of 
communal agency in Book XII.   
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support of “mystery rites” and the traditional notions of pollution and purification at 
870d-874d, homicide is a crime against the divine and, so, a class of impiety.   Thus he 
sets the stage for Book X, the treatment of atheism in which he gives his extended proof 
for the existence of the gods.  This proof is indeed, as Plato has Kleinias say, “a departure 
from the realm of law-giving” (νομοθεσίας ἐκτὸς … βαίνειν, 891d7-8), but it is a 
departure that goes to the very heart of the Magnesian project; hence Plato also has 
Kleinias calls the proof “just about the noblest and most excellent prelude our laws could 
have” (887b-c).  The Athenian mounts a three-fold argument to show, first, that the gods 
exist — above all, that “soul which, availing itself of mind (νοῦν), [is] rightly a god to 
gods and guides all things to flourishing and what is right” (897b1-3)26; second, that the 
gods “pay heed to” (φροντίζειν, 899d5) and “care for” (ἐπιμελοῦνται, 905d2) human 
affairs; and third, that they are “beyond being swayed” by special pleading in the form of 
sacrifices and prayers.27  Thus he gives articulate content to the notion of “the god” that 
he began with in his first prelude to the Magnesians.  In its care for all things, in 
particular all human things, and in its impartiality, this mindful soul is that figure of 
supreme goodness and justice, respectively,28 that is therefore rightly the “measure of all 
things” (716c) and that, by the rule of law we institute for our communal life, we must 
“do all in [our] power to become like.”  
 
                                                
26 In fact, there is a dispute among editors about whether the phrase θεὸν … θεοῖς, “a god to 
gods,” belongs to the original text or is a later revision; see the apparatus to the Oxford text, ad loc, also 
Pangle 1980, p. 534, n. 22. I quote it here in order to provide occasion to acknowledge that there are a host 
of questions to be raised about the Athenian’s argument in Book X, with the relation of the soul that “avails 
itself of nous” to “the gods” only one among them.  Others are: the sense of “virtue” as it applies to that 
soul; the distinction and relation of the astral gods and the Olympians who are the dominant figures in the 
ritual activities of the city and its twelve tribes; and the very senses in which, first, that soul may be 
understood to “care for” human affairs and, second, is available for prayers and sacrifices in the first place, 
in order to be beyond being swayed by partisan ones.  Even while Plato has the Athenian formulate his 
arguments in ways that invite these and many other questions, he also has the Athenian ignore them, 
leaving them, as I put it in Part I, “beyond the horizon” of the conversation.  Are they, however, beyond the 
horizon to which their “more precise education” will lead the Nocturnal Council?  This is a question Plato 
seems to have the Athenian leave intriguingly open with his distinction between what “most of those in the 
city” and the members of the Nocturnal Council understand of the gods, at 966c, and with his closing 
deferral of a specification of the studies the Council members will pursue, made via his pun on ἀπόρρητα 
and ἀπρόρρητα, “indescribable” and “imprescribable” — see n. 5 above.  
27 See, for these three theses, 893b-899d, 899d-905d, 905d-907b, respectively. 
28 This is the significance of the second and third claims that Plato has Kleinias recognize and 
point out at 887b. 
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 [iii] Book XII, 960b-969d: the Nocturnal Council as “mind” and “sight” and 
“hearing” of the communal “animal” as a whole as, in turn, the likeness of the god.  If 
we now turn back to XI-XII, we can see the appropriateness of the Athenian’s ending 
with the presentation of the Nocturnal Council.  In making his way through the regions of 
the life of the city, he has just reached the various ways in which its officers are the city’s 
agents, taking responsibility for its communal life.  In the Nocturnal Council he reaches 
the epitome of this agency.  But, strikingly, he leaves indeterminate the actions the 
Nocturnal Council may take, specifying instead the purpose and basis of its actions.29  
The Council is charged to be the “safeguard” of the city, making the rule of its laws 
“irreversible” (960d).  The basis for whatever it may do to fulfill this purpose is two-fold.  
Its younger members will monitor present life in the city, serving as the “sight” and 
“hearing” (961d, also 964df.) for the elder members, who will provide “memories” 
(964e5) of its past.  These elders, in turn, will be the “mind” (νοῦς) of the city, taking the 
lead in “deliberation” (βουλεύεσθαι, 965a2) aimed at understanding, above all, the 
moral-ethical goal of the laws, the realization of virtue, and its religious basis, the gods 
(966c-d).  To this end, the Council will receive a “more precise education” 
(ἀκριβεστέραν παιδείαν, 965b1) than the rest of the citizenry, focusing especially on 
the unity and diversity of virtue (965d-e) and on the arguments that establish the seniority 
and divinity of soul and the responsibility of “mind” (νοῦς) for the orderly arrangement 
of the heavenly bodies (966e).  
 
 These synoptic notes put us in position, at last, to appreciate the visionary 
experience that the Athenian aims the exegesis, “spoken like a work of poetry,” to 
                                                
29 This indeterminateness, combined with the Athenian’s failure to specify the institutional 
relationship of the Nocturnal Council to the “offices” laid out in Book VI, has allowed interpretation of the 
Council’s role in the city to vary widely.  Bobonich 2002, 390-408, argues persuasively against seeing in 
the Council Plato’s last-minute re-instatement of anything like (to put this into my terms in Part II above) 
an autocracy of — thus read — the philosopher-kings of the Republic or the knowing statesman of the 
Statesman.  This is too big a question to do justice to here, but a cautionary observation does seem timely: 
if one continues (as I do) to regard the Laws as setting these figures beyond the horizon of what is possible 
for its “second-best” city, then one must regard the Athenian’s recourse to the metaphor of the Nocturnal 
Council as “mind” and “sight” and “hearing” as part of his larger recourse to the metaphor of the city as an 
animal and, so, of his attempt to envision the unity of the city, and not an indication that the Council has 
absolute superiority over the city’s other organs and functions. 
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occasion.  With his turn to the Nocturnal Council, he completes the gathering of “all [the] 
parts” of his exegesis and of the city.  That he intends us to envision these as parts, he 
makes clear by his recourse to the metaphor of the city as an “animal” with “soul and 
head” — or, correlatively, “mind” and the faculties of “sight and hearing” (961d) — atop 
its “torso” (964d, 969b).  And that he intends us to understand this living whole as 
aspiring for divinity, he makes clear by his specification of the aim of the studies that will 
occupy its “mind,” the understanding of virtue and of the cosmic soul and mind; 
accordingly, he calls the Nocturnal Council itself ὁ θεῖος … σύλλογος, “the divine 
council” (969b2).  Thus, first recalling us to the figure of the god in Book X and then 
gathering up the “parts” of the city in XI-XII, he invites us to experience “the almost 
completed waking vision” (σχεδὸν ὕπαρ ἀποτετελεσμένον, 969b5)30 of Magnesia as a 
living whole that — in taking upon itself the work of caring for itself by the rule of law, 
hence with what is for human beings the fullest possible “mind,” goodness, and justice — 
strives to internalize the care and impartiality of the god.  This pairing of the god and the 
law-governed agency of the community as measure and measured is the crux of “the 
whole in its precise structure.” 
                                                
30 Why does the Athenian say only σχεδὸν … ἀποτετελεσμένον, “almost completed”?  
Because, presumably, he has not yet specified the studies that will constitute the “more precise education.”  
Note that Socrates in the Republic cites this notion of “precision” (ἀκρίβεια) numerous times as what 
distinguishes the “longer way,” the educational path of the philosopher-to-be — see 435d1 and 504b5, e1, 
and e3.  The Athenian invokes the same notion seven times in distinguishing the understanding the 
members of the Nocturnal Council must, by their “more precise education,” achieve — see 965a6, b1, c1, 
c10, 967b2, and b3.  Does Plato thereby point to the “longer way”?  
